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I. INTRODUCTION
Frequently, modern technology can come in conflict with consti-
tutional rights, and when such a situation arises it becomes necessary
to strike a balance between the safety of society at large and the pro-
tection of individual rights. Examples of this conflict are readily apparent,
e.g., when a person suspected of drunken driving is required to submit
to a breathalyzer or blood test, or when a suspect in the investigation
of a violent crime is forced to undergo a dermal nitrate (paraffin) test
to determine the presence of gun powder on his hands.
The principle that suspects have no constitutional right to refuse a
test designed to produce physical evidence appears to be well established.'
However, admissibility into evidence is governed by a number of criteria,
the first of which is, necessarily, the reliability of the test itself.2 Once
the burden of establishing reliability is met, certain constitutional stan-
dards must likewise be met before the test results will be admitted.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Search and Seizure
In 1914 the Supreme Court departed from the common-law rule and
established a rule for federal courts which excludes any evidence which
is a product of unreasonable search and seizure.' Subsequently, the Court
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) ; People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421
P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966).
2. Cf. Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959); Commonwealth v. West-
wood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 (1936); Clarke v. State, 218 Tenn. 259, 402 S.W.2d 863
(1966).
These cases and numerous others indicate that test results will be held inadmissible when
deemed to be unreliable. The determination of reliability is also of importance in consider-
ing the problem of the testimonial by-product of any physical test that is administered.
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967).
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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imposed this exclusionary rule upon state courts and held the provisions
of the fourth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.'
There have been comparatively few cases in which courts have had
to decide whether the imposition of a chemical test constituted a reason-
able search and seizure. Generally, the problems that have arisen are to
be found in cases where there is a lack of actual consent to the taking
of the test.
It has generally been held that the government may "search the
person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the
fruits or evidences of crime."5 There is no requirement of a warrant for
a search incidental to a lawful arrest.6 In Schmerber v. California7 the
Court recognized that this principle is modified and a warrant could be
required "where intrusions into the human body" are involved.' However,
at the same time the Court indicated that an exception to the requirement
exists in the case of emergency or special circumstances, as in situations
where the evidence is likely to be destroyed.9 Where there is no intrusion
or the exception is met, the test need only meet the criterion of reason-
ableness. 10 The position taken by Florida courts appears to be in accord
with these general principles."
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). The immunity of the fourth
amendment is not an immunity from all search and seizure, but rather from search and
seizure unreasonable in the light of common-law traditions. See People v. Chigales, 237 N.Y.
193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923), where the court, speaking through Justice Cardozo, said:
The basic principle is this: Search of the person is unlawful when the seizure of the
body is a trespass, and the purpose of the search is to discover grounds as yet un-
known for arrest or accusation . . . . Search of the person becomes lawful when
grounds for arrest and accusation have been discovered, and the law is in the act
of subjecting the body of the accused to its physical dominion. Id. at 584.
See also People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766, 771, 312 P.2d 690, 693 (1957), wherein
the court stated:
Where there are reasonable grounds for an arrest, a reasonable search of a person
and the area under his control to obtain evidence against him is justified as an in-
cident to arrest, and the search is not unlawful merely because it precedes, rather
than follows, the arrest.
6. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; People v. Chigales, 237 N.Y. 193, 142
N.E. 583 (1923). It should be noted that an unlawful arrest does not affect admissibility
when there has been express and voluntary consent to the test. See City of Sioux Falls v.
Ugland, 79 S.D. 134, 109 N.W.2d 144 (1961) (blood test).
7. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
8. Id. at 767.
9. For example, alcohol in the blood stream is absorbed within a few hours, so an
attempt to secure it as evidence of a driver's intoxication would not necessitate a search
warrant where the search is incident to arrest. This exception virtually opens the door to
admissibility of blood tests, and since all the other physical or chemical tests now in general
use do not entail any like "intrusion," the limitation would appear to be of little value. As
a further example, a paraffin test merely requires a cotton swab to be wiped across the
suspect's hands, a procedure no more brutal than any prescribed in Dr. Spock's manual for
baby care.
10. In Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968), a penis scraping revealing men-
strual blood of the rape victim's type was held not to have violated the defendant's fourth-
amendment rights since:
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B. Due Process
Following Rockin v. California,"2 defendants in many cases have
attempted to have courts exclude chemical test evidence on the basis that
obtaining such evidence is brutal and therefore constitutes a denial of
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. In Rochin police
invaded the defendant's home without a warrant, and saw him put some-
thing in his mouth. They kicked and beat him, then carried him to a
hospital where his stomach was pumped. As a result, narcotics were found
which were introduced in evidence at his trial.
It is true that Rochin prohibits the use of "brutal methods" to obtain
evidence. However, what "shocked the judicial conscience" in that case
was that the procedures were "too close to the rack and the screw to
permit constitutional differentiation."'" A reasonable search incident to
a lawful arrest is a far different situation, and certainly compulsion by
itself cannot be equated with violence or brutality.
This issue was considered in Schmerber." The Court, while indica-
ting that it would be a different case if the police used inappropriate
force or violence, concluded that the withdrawing of the blood without
consent did not under the circumstances offend "that 'sense of justice'
of which we spoke in Rockin v. California."'" It would seem that the
requirement of due process has little vitality when applied to the more
common physical or chemical tests. 6
"[Tlhe scraping constituted a permissible search of the person incident to a lawful arrest
and involved no intrusion of the body surface." Id. at 505.
Similarly, where a suspect's hands were examined by police under ultra-violet light
without a warrant, it was held not to be a violation of the fourth amendment since the
defendant was under lawful arrest. United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968).
Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), held that a physical examination
of the defendant and removal of narcotics from his rectum was not an unreasonable search
and seizure. The tests more commonly employed may be more aesthetic but certainly not
more suspect than those noted herein.
11. The Second District Court of Appeals, in Carter v. State, 199 So.2d 324 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1967), seemed to say that it was "required procedure" for officers to obtain a warrant
(where there was reasonable opportunity to previously apply for one) prior to conducting
any test. However, it is clear that this case turned upon a search and seizure of personal
articles pursuant to an illegal arrest. See Outten v. State, 197 So.2d 594 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 206 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1968), limiting the holding in Carter, supra.
12. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
13. Id. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407, 1411 (1952):
It should be emphasized that it was the totality of the picture of violence, com-
pulsion and illegality which moved the Court to interfere in the Rochin case, and
that the majority opinion does not indicate that any of the components of that
picture, standing alone, would necessarily transgress against the traditional notions
of fair play which the federal courts must apply as a yardstick of due process.
14. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
15. Id: See also Blefore v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) ; United States v.
Lamb Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
16. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) ; State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d
261 (1953) ; People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953).
COMMENTS
C. Self-Incrimination
Questions most frequently arise regarding the applicability of the
privilege against self-incrimination to the obtaining of specimens of body
fluids or breath for chemical analysis, and use of the results as evidence
at trial.17 Although it would seem logical that the forced extraction of a
suspect's blood or other use of the suspect's own body to provide evidence
against him in court would have the unavoidable effect of causing him
"to bear witness" against himself, this interpretation is, perhaps unfor-
tunately, not in accord with the historical understanding of the privilege."8
It is generally held that the privilege applies only to testimonial
compulsion, i.e., disclosure by utterance. Modern judicial thought, ap-
parently consonant with the common-law history of the privilege, holds
that it does not apply to physical evidence, such as objects or substances
taken from an accused or from his possession and control, even by the
use of reasonable force.' 9 Accordingly, it has long been held that a de-
fendant can be compelled in court to expose parts of his body to aid in
identification," to submit to examination of his private parts,2 ' and to
submit to the removal of substances from the exterior of his body.2
Likewise, it has been held that a defendant's fifth-amendment rights
were not violated by the taking of his fingerprints for the specific pur-
pose of using them against him in a criminal trial,23 nor by compelling
a defendant to speak in a lineup.24 The prevailing law is best summed
up in the words of Justice Holmes in Holt v. United States:25
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to
be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of phys-
17. The privilege against self-incrimination established in the fifth amendment is ap-
plicable to the states as well as to the Federal Government through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
18. Inbau, Self-Incrimination-What Can An Accused Person Be Compelled To Do?,
28 J. CERIS. L. & C. 261, 263 (1950):
Although some of the details concerning the English and early American history of
the privilege are obscure, it is perfectly clear that the primary purpose of the
privilege was to put an end to the practice of employing legal process to extract
from a person's lips an admission of his guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
19. Id. See also 8 J. WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (McNaughton rev. 1961); R. DoNsoAs,
CHEMICAL TESTS AND THE LAW (1966).
20. Grays v. State, 217 So.2d 133 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev.
79 (1879). Cf. State v. Robinson, 221 La. 19, 30-31, 58 So.2d 408, 411 (1952):
[T]he prevailing rule throughout this country is to the effect that this constitutional
guarantee has reference to testimonial compulsion, whether oral or written, only
bodily exhibitions and muscular exertions not being within its protecting scope.
21. See State v. Green, 227 S.C. 1, 86 S.E.2d 598 (1955).
22. Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968); cf. Blackford v. United States, 247
F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957) ; State v. Hagan, 180 Neb. 564, 143 N.W.2d 904 (1966).
23. Gentille v. State, 190 So.2d 200 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
24. Boyer v. State, 182 So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966). See generally State v. Stelzriede,
101 Ariz. 385, 420 P.2d 170 (1966) ; Williams v. State, 239 Ark. 686, 396 S.W.2d 834 (1965);
People v. Lopez, 59 Cal. 2d 653, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963).
25. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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ical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him,
not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be ma-
terial.26
Only a few states have extended the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination beyond the limit of testimonial compulsion and ap-
plied it to obtaining specimens of blood, urine, or breath, etc., for the
purpose of chemical analysis, establishing a rule of consent as the basis
for admissibility.2 7 The majority view is the one that was accepted by
the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California.28 The
Court took the position that withdrawal of blood and admission in ev-
idence of the analysis does not violate an individual's privilege against
self-incrimination." As noted by the majority in Schmerber:
Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced
communication by the accused was involved either in the ex-
traction or in the chemical analysis .... Indeed, his participa-
tion ... was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend
on chemical analysis and on that alone.3"
III. TESTIMONIAL BY-PRODUCT
Having considered the conditions under which the results of a chem-
ical test may be admitted into evidence, it is necessary to consider an
area of the law that is far less clearly defined: the admissibility of a de-
fendant's refusal to take a test, or evasive conduct just prior to the test
being administered. It is reasonably well-established that such conduct
or refusal is not admissible if the test result would be inadmissible.3' But
what of such tests as that administered in Schmerber, i.e., is evidence of
refusal to take a test admissible where the test results would themselves
be admissible?12 Would a suspect who refused to take a paraffin test and
26. Id. at 252-53.
27. State v. Merrow, 161 Me. 11, 208 A.2d 659 (1965) ; Spencer v. State, 404 P.2d 46
(Okla. Crim. Ct. 1965) ; Fletcher v. State, 382 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Crim. Ct. 1964).
28. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
29. Id. at 761:
[T~he privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature, and . . . the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in
question . . . did not involve compulsion to these ends.
As indicated in the vigorous dissenting opinions of Justices Black, Douglas and Fortas, this
is probably too restrictive an interpretation of the constitutional protection.
30. Id. at 765.
31. For example, lie detector tests are not admissible; therefore, it is generally held that
evidence tending to establish that an accused was unwilling to take such a test is not
admissible. Such is the rule in Florida. Johnson v. State, 166 So.2d 798 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964)
(which stated the general rule, but held defendant to have waived the right by placing a
polygraph expert on the stand).
32. Whatever the decision regarding admissibility of such evidence, it is clear that it is
not dependent on the reason for refusal, even if that reason is advice of counsel. As was
said in People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 548, 421 P.2d 401, 404, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396-
(1966):
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then started to spit on his hands and rub them when the police began to
administer the test without his consent be able to keep evidence of his
conduct out of the trial?3"
A number of courts have been confronted with this problem. Some
have permitted the introduction of such evidence, holding that a refusal
to submit to a chemical test is a circumstance indicating consciousness
of guilt, but the use of the refusal in evidence does not compel the de-
fendant to incriminate himself.84 Other appellate courts have likened
evidence of a refusal to submit to a chemical test to evidence of silence
on the part of an accused after his arrest or his failure to testify in his
own behalf. Because such evidence is not admissible in their jurisdiction
or cannot be commented upon before a jury, these courts reject ev-
idence of refusals to submit to chemical tests.", A number of these latter
courts have, however, held that this privilege of exclusion can be
waived. 6
Although the issue was not directly presented in Schmerber, the
Supreme Court did consider the problem of the by-product of an admis-
sible physical test. In a footnote they stated:
This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the State
tried to show that the accused had incriminated himself when
told he would have to be tested. Such incriminating evidence
may be an unavoidable by-product of the compulsion to take
the test, especially for an individual who fears the extraction
or opposes it on religious grounds. If it wishes to compel per-
sons to submit to such attempts to discover evidence, the State
may have to forego the advantage of any testimonial products
"Counsel has the right to argue reasons alternative to consciousness of guilt to explain
defendant's refusal."
The defendant's reason for refusing to take the test, if such refusal is admissible evidence,
bears on the weight the trier of fact should assign to such refusal. It should be considered
a question of probative value, not admissibility.
33. Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959), held that a defendant's re-
fusal to submit to a paraffin test was not admissible into evidence. However, the court did
not suppress such evidence on the theory of "testimonial by-product;" rather, it did so on
the basis that the test results were not admissible because of the unreliability of the test.
34. See People v. Conterno, 170 Cal. App. 2d 817, 339 P.2d 968 (1959); State v. Dur-
rant, 55 Del. 510, 188 A.2d 526 (1963) ; State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958) ;
Alldredge v. State, 239 Ind. 256, 156 N.E.2d 888 (1959); State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168,
300 N.W. 275 (1941) ; State v. Fields, 74 N.M. 560, 395 P.2d 908 (1964) ; State v. Nutt, 78
Ohio App. 336, 65 N.E.2d 675 (1946) ; State v. Smith, 230 S.C. 164, 94 S.E.2d 886 (1956);
City of Barron v. Covey, 271 Wis. 10, 72 N.W.2d 387 (1955).
This was also the view adopted in Virginia prior to the enactment of a statute spe-
cifically providing that such evidence shall not be admissible. VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.1-55
(1960). See Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d 614 (1954).
35. See State v. Sullivan, 17 Ill. App. 2d 251, 149 N.E.2d 461 (1958); Cupp v. State,
373 P.2d 260 (Okla. Crim. Ct. 1962); Watts v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 63, 318 S.W.2d 77
(1958).
36. E.g., Gilley v. City of Anchorage, 376 P.2d 484 (Alas. 1962) (no objection); Barn-
hart v. State, 302 P.2d 793 (Okla. Crim. Ct. 1956) (accused opened the door); City of
Sioux Falls v. Johnson, 78 S.D. 272, 100 N.W.2d 750 (1960) (direct examination of a de-
fense witness).
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of administering the test - products which would fall within
the privilege.37
If the Court had concluded its statement here, the question of the ad-
missibility of the refusal to take a test may have been foreclosed in favor
of inadmissibility. However, the note continued:
Indeed, there may be circumstances in which the pain, danger,
and the severity of an operation would almost inevitably cause
a person to prefer confession to undergoing the "search," and
nothing we say today should be taken as establishing the per-
missibility of compulsion in that case. 8
Apparently it is only in the extreme situations mentioned, e.g., pain, dan-
ger, etc., that the limitation on the use of a testimonial by-product
applies. 9
Subsequent to the Schmerber decision, several jurisdictions have
considered the problem of testimonial by-products of physical tests. The
highest courts of California, 40 Ohio,41 and New Jersey,4 have recently
held that a defendant's refusal to take such tests is admissible evidence
and does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. The sole
case to the contrary appears to be Gay v. City of Orlando.4
The leading case on the subject is People v. Sudduth." The court
was concerned with the prosecution's comment upon the refusal of the
defendant to submit to a breathalyzer test in light of recent constitutional
cases. After analyzing Schmerber and other pertinent decisions, the court,
in a well-reasoned opinion by Justice Traynor, held that the defendant's
refusal to take the test was admissible since the test results would be ad-
missible.45 Unlike Griffin v. California46 the admission of a defendant's
37. 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966).
The inference created by that language standing alone is that if the petitioner in that
case had properly raised the objection, such testimonial by-products would have been in-
admissible as a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 562 (1892), the Court said:
Such situations call to mind the principle that the protection of the privilege is as
broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard .... Id. at 764.
38. Id. at 765 n.9.
39. See People v. Ellis, 538 Cal. 2d 529, 538, 421 P.2d 393, 398, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393
(1966) (Traynor, C. J.) for a similar interpretation of the Schmerber footnote.
40. People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 996 (1967).
41. City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968).
42. State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967).
43. 202 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
44. 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 996
(1967).
45. Id. at 403-04. Justice Traynor recognized that:
The disparate results found in other jurisdictions may be ascribed to the presence
of an underlying constitutional or statutory right to refuse to produce the physical
evidence sought. Statet that recognize a tight to refuse to take such tests exclude
evidence of a refusal. States that recognize no right to refuse allow testimony and
comment on the refusal.
46. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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refusal to take a chemical test and comment by counsel thereon would
not dilute any constitutional right."
The rule in Florida dealing with conduct of an accused upon being
requested to take a scientific test is not yet settled, but in Gay v. City
of Orlando4" the Fourth District Court of Appeals appears to have
adopted what may be deemed the minority position:
[R]esults of a breathalyzer are not self-incriminating. The
court [in Schmerber] appears to imply that because there is no
privilege as to the breathalyzer, refusal to submit to the test is
not an invocation of the privilege such as refusing to take the
stand would be. It follows that comment or evidence of the re-
fusal to take a breathalyzer or blood test does not fall within
the rule in Griffin.
The admissibility of petitioner's refusal must be measured
by general self-incrimination principles. It seems obvious that
petitioner's statement was self-incriminating and carried an in-
ference of guilt. In fact it is difficult to see any relevancy in his
statement other than providing such an inference.
The Supreme Court noted that if an accused incriminates
himself when faced with the prospect of taking a test, the tes-
timony may be a product of compulsion and inadmissible.49
This holding is, however, not absolute, since the case is clearly dis-
tinguishable from most of the cases that have held the other way on the
question of admissibility.50 In Gay the defendant was told by the police
that he had a right not to take a breathalyzer test, and the defendant
relied upon this advice. Nevertheless, the prosecution introduced his re-
fusal in evidence against him. As stated by the court:
In the case before us petitioner was confronted with a choice
of either voluntarily submitting to the test or refusing and
thereby making a self-incriminating statement. While the re-
sults of a properly administered breathalyzer test are not
within the privilege, self-incriminating testimonial by-products
are.
5 1
A distinction obviously exists where the defendant has a choice of
submitting or not submitting to a test. In such a situation, the testimony
may, in fact, be a product of compulsion and therefore inadmissible.
5 2
47. City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968). See
also State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967), wherein the defendant refused to sub-
mit to a recording of his voice. The court held, citing People v. Sudduth, that comment on
a defendant's willful refusal to permit the obtaining of a sample of his voice did not in-
fringe upon the defendant's fifth-amendment rights.
48. 202 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
49. Id. at 898.
50. See note 45 supra.
51. 202 So.2d 896, 898 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
52. Some states' courts have held that the fact of refusal cannot be used to create any
1969]
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This distinction was recently recognized by the Second District
Court of Appeals in State v. Esperti.53 The court in that case was faced
with the question of the admissibility of refusal and evasive conduct
prior to administering a paraffin test. Gay v. City of Orlando54 was
considered but distinguished on the basis of the choice, and the court
noted that the defendant's "actions were a direct by-product, not of the
administration of the test, but the wrongful refusal to submit thereto;
and wrongful conduct poisons its own fruit."55
In Esperti the defendant was arrested within a few hours after a
homicide. At the police station the officers told the defendant that they
were going to administer a dermal nitrate test. As soon as the defendant's
attorney left the station" the officers attempted to administer the chem-
ical test. The defendant refused to submit, spat on his hands, wiped
them, and tried to rub tobacco ashes on them. The court, in a less than
clear decision, analogized the actions to those of an accused in resisting
lawful arrest, in escaping or fleeing from lawful custody or remaining
silent in the face of an accusatory statement -all of which are admis-
sible. The defendant's actions were "susceptible of no prima facie ex-
planation except consciousness of guilt . . .,.
The opinion would appear to clearly confront and resolve the issue
of admissibility of refusal to take the test. Unfortunately, the court left
the door open to further confusion by stating that the defendant's refusal
was not conditional.58 In fact, the refusal was conditioned, i.e., on the
officers' obtaining a warrant. The court failed to direct its attention to
this point. What effect, if any, this omission will have on the ultimate
resolution of "by-product" questions is purely a matter of speculation.
As has been noted, 9 it is unlikely that a warrant would be required for
the administration of such tests and hence should have no bearing on the
admissibility of the refusal to submit.
IV. CONCLUSION
To the extent that Gay holds a refusal to submit to a test to be a
"testimonial by-product" and inadmissible per se, the decision is in con-
unfavorable inference against a defendant, on the premise that under their chemical test or
implied consent laws a defendant is given an absolute right to refuse a test. E.g., People v.
Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 664, 113 N.E.2d 516,
150 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1956) (reversed a conviction of motor vehicle homicide where evidence
of such a refusal by the defendant had been admitted by the trial court).
53. 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
54. 202 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
55. State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
56. It would seem that a sixth-amendment argument might have been effectively
raised. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The recent controversial release of
Detroit Black Activists who were suspected of murder was based on this principle. Tnvrz,
April 11, 1969, at 43.
57. State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
58. Id. at 418.
59. Note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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flict with the growing body of legal opinion, and, it is submitted, does not
reflect the final solution of the issue by the Florida courts. The Esperti
decision appears to be in accord with the more prevalent view allowing
such testimony into evidence once the constitutional standards have been
met. It is likely that this is the view which will ultimately be adopted by
the Florida Supreme Court.60
60. There now appears to be sufficient conflict to give the Florida Supreme Court
certiorari jurisdiction.
